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摘要:The parallel distribution is a non-centralized mechanism for distributing indivisible items to agents,which can take into account computing efficiency,economic benefits and social equality.However,as most decentralized allocation mechanism,the parallel protocol is not strategy-proof.In this paper,supposed the manipulator has additive preferences with possible indifferences between single objects,we study the most basic manipulation problem under the parallel allocation mechanism.For any given set of items,we proved that the agent1 can determine whether all objects in the set can be guaranteed in polynomial time.In addition,we given an algorithm for finding pessimism and proved the correctness,completeness and time complexity of polynomial.
会议名称:

2020 International Conference on Computer Science and Communication Technology (ICCSCT 2020)

会议时间:

2020-07-25

会议地点:

中国湖北武汉

  • 专辑:

    信息科技

  • 专题:

    计算机软件及计算机应用

  • DOI:

    10.26914/c.cnkihy.2020.033278

  • 分类号:

    TP301.6

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